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Abstract: This introduction proposes to investigate mismatches and indetermina-
cies in languages much more than has hitherto been done. Such seemingly un-
ruly aspects of language(s), it is argued, are interesting since they may help shed
light on the internalmake-upof grammatical systems. The question of the internal
make-up of grammar(s), it is argued, cannot be addressed by the normal modus
operandi of linguistic research,which is to findmatches (rather thanmismatches)
between the observable (sound and meaning) interface systems, and to find how
the interface representations map unto each other deterministically: It is only in
the “lo-fi” aspects of mappings that the internal mechanisms of the overall gram-
matical architecture may reveal themselves.
The introduction also points out that our concern is independent of the vari-
ous theoretical orientations linguistsmay choose for theirwork, since theproblem
presents itself in all approaches to language research currently available, it seems
– if in slightly different ways.
We propose, in sum, that mismatches and indeterminacies are an extremely
worthwhile field for future linguistic research, and one that should be on the
agenda (or minimally, within the field of view) for linguists of all theoretical
convictions.
Keywords: components of grammar, functionalism, generative grammar, typol-
ogy, mismatches
1 Fundamental questions this volume seeks to
address
This installment of ZS Online concerns itself with the architecture of grammati-
cal systems. Grammatical systems are composed of subcomponents in different
ways in different grammatical theories. Many descriptions subdivide phenomena
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into phonological, morphological and syntactic ones, and use different subcom-
ponents of the grammar to represent and explain each of these types of phenom-
ena, respectively. Subcomponents of this type are not only kept apart by naming
conventions, however: Different computational atoms, rules or operations, and
(consequently) structures are employed by the different subcomponents, supply-
ing the distinctions with actual theoretical substance.
Sometimes, distinctions proposed in the literature are abandoned by newer
proposals, for example when morphology is considered as entirely syntactic, or
at least as so similar to syntax as to warrant the assumption that there is no sepa-
rate morphological component after all (as in Chomsky 1965). In other cases, the
classic subdivisions are not only retained, but carried further. In some theories,
certain grammatical subcomponents are themselves deconstructed into further
parts. In Minimalist frameworks, syntax is divided up into core syntax, and a sep-
arate branch of the grammatical architecture taking care of the mapping to PF of
core syntactic representations (Chomsky 2007, 2008; Chomsky et al. 2019, a. o.).
In yet other cases, subdivisions are created that run orthogonally to the classic
subdivisions. Inflectional morphology is considered as a part of syntax, but word
formation is considereda separate component (as part of a computational concep-
tion of the lexicon, cf. Chomsky 1970; Anderson 1982). Yet other theories assume
that morphology as a whole is handled by the lexicon (Jackendoff 1972; Lapointe
1980; Selkirk 1982;Di Sciullo andWilliams 1987). Yet other approaches completely
deconstruct notions like lexicon andmorphology into multiple different architec-
tural subcomponents (Halle and Marantz 1993).
In this volume, we do not want to revive discussions as to which of these ap-
proaches are right, wrong, or better than others. Rather, we want to pose some
questions which follow, we believe, more or less directly from any division of la-
bor in grammars, i. e. questions that apply to all grammars that are decomposable
systems at all.1 As soon as any subcomponents are assumed, at least two families
of questions come up.
I) The first question we can ask is how often we find cases where subcomponents
that are expected to regulate their assigned aspects of structure building in fact
shirk their duties, as it were, i. e. leave some pertinent phenomena from their do-
main unregulated, or leave aspects of regulated phenomena indeterminate, upon
closer empirical scrutiny of the subcomponents’ actual respective outputs.
1 This would seem to hold for most grammars, but some proposals probably do not qualify, e. g.
Hopper’s (1987) explicitly unsystematic approach to the constitution of forms in his Emergent
Grammar, and similar proposals.
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The terms unregulated and indeterminate are understood in a specific way in
this introduction. A subcomponent is assigned phenomena to handle, if phenom-
ena of such types are explicitly described as being handled by that subcomponent
by the theories that postulate the subcomponents. For example, nobody will be
surprised to hear that morphological subcomponents are often assigned tasks
relating to word-internal structure composition, where the output structures are
semantically meaningful. This sets apart the morphological subcomponents of
many grammar models from syntax because syntactic structure-building de-
scribes output structures larger than words, but also from phonology because
it describes structures that are not themselves meaning-bearing. Given these as-
signments of duties for the grammatical subcomponents, we are in a position
(vis-à-vis each grammatical model that specifies such duties) to identify unex-
pected behaviors of subcomponents, where subcomponents do not carry out
tasks that are, by assumption, expected of them. Unexpected derelictions of duty
would therefore be for a morphological component to leave prima facie aspects
of word-internal form aspects open, or fail to address the interpretation effects
of such word-internal structural aspects. Similarly, syntactic theories that leave
open questions of word order that would seem to be genuinely syntactic in nature
(or fail to address compositional/ structural interpretations that would seem to
follow) would seem to be, at least in part, neglecting tasks assigned to them.
Such failures can come about in different ways. A subcomponent of a gram-
mar could leave certain pertinent aspects from its domain unregulated. By this
term, we mean that the relevant subcomponent does not even attempt to specify
regulations that would constrain a phenomenon from its intended domain of ap-
plication. Let us try and imagine what unregulated phenomena could look like. If
grammars involve subcomponents, it follows trivially that these subcomponents
never consider linguistic phenomena aswithin their domainwhichwould involve
categories that are not defined in relation to the domain itself. For example, syn-
tax may be concerned with the structure of sentences (amongst other things),
but we certainly do not expect syntactic systems to regulate whether a sentence
starts with an obstruent, since the category “obstruent” would have to be con-
sidered phonological by definition. Also, we do not expect syntactic theories to
impose constraints on semantic interpretations such as “This clause is always
false when uttered by a high priest of the Great Juju at the bottom of the sea”.
The domain in which sentences are truth-functionally evaluated, and questions
of speaker choice are simply not syntactic pursuits. These cases we take to be un-
controversial, in that we know of no grammars who would disagree with such
assessments. However, as soon as we stray from such clear cases of assignments
of duties, we feel that we are actually relying, as a discipline, on more or less in-
tuitive assessments. For example, the question which aspects syntax can regu-
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late is one that recently has proven hard to answer. The actual speaker is to our
knowledge never represented in any grammar, but the social distance between
the interlocutors can be represented. This is what we find in languages with hon-
orifics (Hasegawa 2006): the form of a verb or of a personal pronoun varies de-
pending on the social distance between the speaker and (typically) the addressee.
Similarly, speaker and addressee seem to play fundamental role in syntax proper,
when we take phenomena like allocative agreement into consideration (Antonov
2015; Miyagawa 2017; Oyharçabal 1993): in allocative agreement, the addressee is
encoded on the verb by a specific morpheme, similar to the subject. It is therefore
no trivial task to initially determine the scope of grammar as a whole nor of each
specific subcomponent in particular. In this volume, therefore, we try to address
questions such as: What should be regulated by syntax? What is clearly a task for
morphology? What would a compositional analysis of a meaning-bearing struc-
ture have to involve? Looking at the different ways that grammatical tasks have
been carved up by different theories, as outlined above, we find that this question
in fact becomes only more meaningful: Which aspects of structures have been
proposed to be left unregulated by some postulated subcomponent of proposed
grammars?
Some phenomena are not left completely unregulated by a grammatical sub-
component, but neither are they regulated to the greatest extent imaginable.
Thus, the subcomponent in question issues some constraints with regard to the
phenomenon, but it does so with poor detail resolution. The constraints do not
suffice to regulate all the empirical distinctions that can be made out from the
language data the grammar is designed to describe. For example, core syntax in
current Chomskyan generative grammar does not really address word order to the
greatest extent possible. On the contrary, the operationMerge (the only structure-
building operation standardly assumed currently to exist in core syntax) only
generates unordered sets of syntactic objects (lexical items and larger structural
objects). The sets formed byMerge only impose some ordering constraints which,
however, do not come close to precise predictions regarding actual word orders.
Suppose that the structure-building operation Merge merges two syntactically
atomic elements, the elements X and Y , as in (1).
(1) Merge (X, Y) → {X, Y}
It is important to point out that this operation is not a phrase-structure rule, and
does not generate a phrase per se. Rather, Merge simply states the fact that a syn-
tactic object could exist that is composed of two component objects, X and Y in
our example. However, no linear ordering is imposed by Merge. In other words,
the set {X, Y} conforms to both the orders X Y as well as Y X. As we see, then, all
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expectable orders of two elements are allowed, and no ordering restriction at all is
imposed at this step of a derivation. Ordering restrictions only come about when
the recursive aspect of Merge is called upon, i. e., the ability of the operation to
merge complex objects, the output of Merge, as the input to (other instances of)
Merge.2 Witness now in (2), how such Merge instances play out.
(2) Merge ({X, Y}, Z) → {{X, Y} Z}
Upon merging a third element, Z, as in (2), Merge begins to show its potential
to issue ordering restrictions. By common assumption, the set {{X, Y} Z} does not
conform to six ordering options (3! = 3×2×1 = 6), but rather only to four orderings.
The third element, Z, cannot intervene between X and Y, as shown in (3).
(3) {{X, Y} Z} conforms to:
a. X Y Z
b. Y X Z
c. Z X Y
d. Z Y X
e. *X Z Y (Z may not intervene between X and Y)
f. *Y X Z (Z may not intervene between X and Y)
To put it simply, upon every instance of Merge, the newly merged syntactic ob-
ject may come to be linearized before or after the syntactic object generated by
previous instances of Merge. This leads to a sizeable reduction of options, when
the number of such merged objects increases. Suppose, instances of Merge have
created a complex object such as {{{{{X, Y} Z} A} B} C}. Upon merging yet another
object, O, again only two ordering options are admitted: For O to precede, or fol-
low, the complex object. As we see, then, every instance of Merge doubles the
number of potential orders of the merged object. Seven objects could therefore
be arranged in 27 = 128 orders. In an unconstrained system, however, upon ev-
ery instance of Merge the number of orders would multiply by the total number
2 Note right here that recursion in syntactic structure-building by Merge has absolutely nothing
whatsoever to do with the potential for structures to self-embed (e. g., a CP within a CP, a NP
within a NP, etc.). Such self-embeddings were used to demonstrate that the system could create
infinitely complex structures, mostly in presentations of older versions of Chomskyan generative
syntax (which still relied on phrase-structure based technology). While these demonstrations
underlined the recursive nature of structure-building operations, self-embedding was never the
same as recursion. In current syntax, Merge is recursive in the sense just outlined: it can accept
its own output as input. To put it very bluntly, as soon as a two-word object is merged with a
third word, Merge has demonstrated its recursive nature – with no self-embedding required for
the demonstration.
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of merged objects. In the example just given, six merged objects (X, Y, Z, A, B, C)
can form 6! linear orders. Adding a seventh element (O), this set of orders must be
multiplied by 7 (since 7! = 6! × 7), yielding 7! = 5040 orders. Clearly, then, Merge
(and ipso facto, core syntax) issues some ordering restrictions. Just as clearly, how-
ever, there are still many potential word orders associated with the output of core
syntax. In this way, core syntax does not leave word order unregulated, but it does
leave it indeterminate, i. e. it does not issue word order restrictions so strict and
deterministic that they would result in the prediction of just a single word order,
or some reasonably small set of word orders.
Therefore, many more detailed word order properties are not constrained de-
terministically by core syntax. In order to map the sets of (sets of...) structural
objects onto linearly ordered descriptions of sentence forms, two additional op-
erations have to be carried out (minimally). Firstly, the linearly unordered sets of
elements have to be linearized. Assume that the operationMerge has been applied
to two syntactic atoms, eat and cake, in the way shown in (4).
(4) Merge (eat, cake) → {eat, cake}
Secondly, however, this set of two lexical items must be linearized at the relevant
stage of the derivation, i. e. the unordered set must bemapped onto a linear order,
as in (5).
(5) {eat, cake} → eat cake
This latter operation, however, is not standardly assumed to be syntactic in na-
ture (Chomsky et al. 2019 for a recent assessment along these lines), but would be
relegated solely to an extra-syntactic linearization mechanism in the mapping to
PF, illustrated in (6).
(6) a. Merge (essen, Kuchen) → {essen, Kuchen} (= core syntactic represen-
tation)
b. {essen, Kuchen} → Kuchen essen (=mapping to PF)
In this way, then, the different VPword orders (OV for German, VO for English) are
derived in such a way that the similar (or identical) meaning constitution is han-
dled by the same core syntactic operation: Tomerge a predicate such as eat/essen
with anargument suchas cake/Kuchen is to assign the argument the internal argu-
ment role of the predicate. To handle this assignment in this (order-independent)
way seemsattractive if one assumes (as is nowalso standardlydone) that core syn-
tax caters very directly to the requirements of the semantic interface. The identi-
cal (structural) meaning of the two VPs is brought about by the samemechanism,
so that cake/Kuchen wind up to be the patient arguments of eat/essen, respec-
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tively. Core syntax in this model, thus, is not at all concerned with properties of
externalization, i. e. the operations required to derive the form side of a structure,
word order being one property of the form side. In the example just described,
the differences between the structures are lexical – the words used – and (for lack
of a better word) “PFey”. Linearization effects on word order are not represented
syntax-internally, according to this model. Rather, they are handled by a separate
subcomponent of the grammar, which maps the output of core syntax onto lin-
early specified sequences. As we can see, then, the syntactic subcomponent of
current Chomskyan generative grammar leaves word order massively underspec-
ified – a state of affairs we want to represent by saying that word order properties
are partially indeterminate within core syntax.
In a similar vein, elements that move in a sentence are now to be taken as
simply merged in more than one copy. Rather than literally moving an element as
such, we now findmultiple copies of the element in question. Suppose Merge has
constructed some set of (sets of...) structural objects, and suppose further that the
linearization of this set-theoretic object has already been taken care of. We then
arrive at a representation such as (7)).3
(7) [Peter [does [not [Peter [v [eat cake]]]]]]
This linearized structure is then in need of yet another operation that is relevant
for the determination of word order: The lexical item Peter appears in two copies.
An algorithm called copy spellout has to decide which of these copies will be
phonologically represented, since multiple spellouts of copies are not the norm
(despite the fact that they have been argued to exist in some cases, in some lan-
guages). Only a linearized structure that has taken care of the spellout of copies of
elements is supposed to be representative of the relevant word order the language
displays. For English, the spellout algorithm choses the structurally higher copy
for spellout, as shown in (8).
(8) [Peter [does [not [Peter [v [eat cake]]]]]] → [Peter [does [not [Peter [v [eat
cake]]]]]]
This linearized structure with copies designated for spellout can now be read as a
representation of the linear word order of Peter does not eat cake. Again, the spell-
out algorithm removes a task considered syntactic in many grammars (including
previous versions of Chomskyan generative syntax) from the realm of core syn-
3 Current Chomskyan models of syntax have largely dispensed with phrase structural notions,
certainly as a part of core syntax. The presentation, while compatible with such older formaliza-
tions, is intended to convey the linearized version of a core syntactic output (set) structure. We
do not advocate a return to phrase structural notions.
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tax. Since the spellout algorithm in modern Chomskyan generative syntax is not
assumed to be syntactic, core syntax is again indeterminate. It supplies the copies
that the spellout algorithm can decide over (restricting choices for word orders),
but leaves the details of the decision unspecified otherwise (does not make spell-
out choices itself).
In sum, we see that word order is, in fact, only very partially restricted by
core syntax in these approaches, and therefore word order qualifies as a property
that is left indeterminate by standard current Chomskyan generative proposals:
partially specified, but with a (very) limited resolution of word order detail.
II) Given these definitions of unregulated and indeterminate aspects of grammat-
ical subcomponents, we can now turn to the second set of questions about the
division of labour among the various grammatical subcomponents. First, are we
in fact in a position to know which aspects of structure-building are unregulated
byor indeterminate in specific subcomponents in our grammars?4 Thepapers pre-
sented in this volume state (in various different ways) that we may find that sub-
components may delegate tasks differently than what the original assignment of
dutiesmighthave ledus to expect.We therefore submit that unregulatedand inde-
terminate aspects of structure building may constitute very valuable data to find
how the internal makeup of grammatical architectures can be (or cannot be) con-
strued, since questions of the internal makeup of grammatical systems are hard
to observe otherwise. While speakers can intuit (sentence-level, compositional)
meanings relatively precisely, and observe word and morpheme orders directly,
we still have no way of looking into grammatical systems’ internal makeups. We
only observe the interface representations of the system, never its internal repre-
sentations or mechanisms.
Second, what happens when aspects of linguistic structures are left less than
fully determined in one of these ways? We might wonder whether an indetermi-
nacy left open by some subcomponent can be, or even is always, taken up by
another subcomponent – and some of the articles collected in this volume ar-
gue just this. For example, if the indeterminacy is taken up by some component,
then the question arises whether this component is a subcomponent of the gram-
mar or some component interfering with the grammar. The first position boils
4 Note that throughout we have not included phonological subcomponents of our grammar.
These are not related to meaning constitution, so that one aspect relevant for identifying mis-
matches or indeterminacies between forms and meanings is simply not present. We believe that
“layered” phonological models, which delegate specific aspects of the descriptions of phonolog-
ical structures to specific phonological (sub-) subcomponents may show similar properties, but
these questions are not addressed in this introduction, or in any of the papers collected in this
volume.
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down to the claim that the blanks are filled by someother grammatical subsystem,
whereas the second view suggests that all aspects of language use might kick in,
like frequency. In recent years, a trend emerged that combines both views, argu-
ing that grammatical subcomponents incorporate information about frequency.
In OT, constraints can be weighed, so the ranking between two constraints A and
B is not strictly A outweighing B, but only that A outweighs B in 70%. Whether
this blurring of the division between language and language use is initially attrac-
tive or ultimately correct is of no real concern. What matters is that this approach
has implications for what counts as a grammatical subcomponent and how their
interactions can be modeled.
Third, we can ask other consequent questions. Are we supposed to believe
that the subcomponent that takes up the slack is a system that directly interfaces
with the subcomponent introducing the slack? Or can we assume that subcom-
ponents only indirectly related to each other (i. e., which handle incommensu-
rable representations via completely different operations) can also exploit options
left unconstrained by the other? How loosely or strictly constrained do grammat-
ical subcomponents interact in this regard? Conversely, do we find cases where
subcomponents of the grammar do not take up the slack for each other after all,
but rather, introduce actual mismatches between different linguistic levels? Mis-
matches can be defined as cases where there are distinctions between two (or
more) structures on one level of description, which are, however, obscured on
other levels (or minimally, one level).
Mismatches betweendifferent levels of representationhavebeenargued for in
descriptions of many languages, and some authors present in this volume argue
for mismatches of this kind, too. To give a simple example of what mismatches
may look like, take the interpretation of quantifier scopes across languages. It
could be argued that the operation of quantifier raising in English is simply a tech-
nical representation of amismatch between the sentence-level semantic level and
surface forms in English. Two very clearly distinct semantic readings of the sen-
tence in the following example can be given [cf. (9-b) and (9-c)], and both differ
in truth values vis-à-vis situations. However, these two semantic representations
are still expressed indeterminately by a single form, as in (9-a)):
(9) a. Sentence form: Every man loves a woman.
b. Meaning 1: For everyman, there is onewoman such that thatman loves
that woman.
c. Meaning 2: There is one woman, such that every man loves that
woman.
Current Chomskyan generative models do not assume quantifier raising as a des-
ignated syntactic operation. Rather the combination of (internal) Merge of quan-
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tified phrases and the spellout algorithm of English results in a mismatch be-
tween two clearly distinguishable interpretations, (10-b) and (10-c), and one sur-
face form (10-a).
(10) a. Every man loves a woman.
b. [TP everyman [vP everyman loves awoman]] [cf. (9-b))]
c. [a woman ... [TP everyman [vP everyman loves awoman]]] [cf. (9-c)]
We have chosen the examples so far to be from a single type of grammar frame-
work, namely different versions of Chomskyan generative grammar. The impres-
sion could arise that the matters this volume discusses are only relevant for,
or formulable in, or even caused by, Chomskyan generative approaches. This,
however, is not what we are trying to say – and in fact, it is not true in the first
place. We cannot discuss all grammatical theories ever proposed here, of course,
but we can quickly demonstrate that different grammars frameworks warrant es-
sentially similar questions, since they grapple with comparable issues. Consider
a typical non-Chomskyan, non-derivational framework, such as Head-Driven
Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG). There are two fundamental differences be-
tween Chomskyan frameworks and HPSG. First, HPSG’s grammar conception
is not that of a device that successively builds up a syntactic structure, but one
where the grammar defines properties syntactic structures need to satisfy. In other
words, whereas a syntactic structure is generated in Chomskyan frameworks, the
syntactic structure is given in HPSG and the grammar inspects whether it satisfies
all relevant properties. Let us illustrate this with a specific example from Ger-
man. As is well known, German has verb second declarative main clauses. Under
a Chomskyan perspective, this requirement follows from an independent con-
straint in the grammar of German that the specifier position of the highest clausal
projection be filled by some phrase (maybe for EPP or edge feature reasons). For
HPSG, however, the grammar of German contains a constraint requiring the rele-
vantmain clause type to have verb second order. Any incoming structure violating
this constraint will be rejected by the grammar. Second, HPSG has a radically dif-
ferent conception of “syntactic structure” to begin with. In many versions of
Chomskyan grammar, syntactic structures are (some version of) phrase-structure
trees, typically a succession of phrase-structure trees, or equivalents thereof (e. g.
derivation trees). HPSG, however, does not employ phrase-structure trees but
uses typed feature structures, that is, attribute-value matrices. Although we find
that the two frameworks have radically different conceptions of grammar and
of the type of structures they describe, our questions re-emerge in HPSG just as
in any Chomskyan framework. Recall the above mentioned constraint requiring
verb second order in German declarative main clauses. Obviously, this syntactic
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constraint interacts with constraints from other subcomponents of the grammar:
the XP has to be morphologically well formed (for example in terms of case mark-
ing and agreement), and the words the XP is composed have to be phonologically
well formed as well. But there seems to be no component that regulates which
XP appears in the preverbal position. It can be an argument or an adjunct of the
main clause or some embedded clause (if present). The syntactic component does
not seem to care and leaves room for a multitude of options. The question arises,
which components (if any) regulate which XP appears preverbally? Is there some
meta-constraint at work, requiring the closest possible XP to position in the CP?
Are there discourse/ information structural restrictions (topic/focus structure,
focus/background structure)? If so, are such factors subcomponents of the gram-
mar or not? Can extralinguistic factors regulate which XP appears pre-verbally?
The answers to all these questions have implications for the architecture of gram-
mar quite generally. More importantly, we find that the questions we address in
this volume arise in more than one framework. We see, then, that there is nothing
specific about Chomskyan architectures that would make them susceptible (or
even only more susceptible) to the questions we have outlined above.
Still, readers might point out, Chomskyan generative models and HPSG still
share many assumptions. Maybe other types of grammars do not relate to our
questions in the same way after all? We do not believe this to be the case. To
counter this suspicion, consider grammars of the functional(ist) type. These come
in different versions, of course (just as formal(ist) grammars do), but it can still be
shown that a functionalist outlook on language does not take away fromour topic.
Functionally oriented grammars can be distinguished by the status they as-
sign to the formal description of language. Van Valin (2001), for example, as-
sumes that there exist conservative functional grammars, which basically try to
add a concern for communicative functions onto grammars that use the same for-
mal means and mechanisms as formal(ist) grammars to characterize the forms
of languages. These form mechanisms are only taken to express the communica-
tive functions that have been added to the picture, to represent communicative
language functions. It stands to reason that conservative functional grammars
will show the same fault lines between grammatical mechanisms – if and when
they employ the same subcomponents as the grammarswe have discussed above.
Functionalist grammars of the moderate type (Van Valin 2001: 149–150) try to re-
place the formalist representations of linguistic structures with alternative rep-
resentations that explain the forms that serve to express communicative func-
tions. One such theory, for example, is Dik’s Functional Grammar (Dik 1997). In
this grammar, language structures are considered primarily semanto-pragmatic
formulae, and expression rules then help map the semanto-pragmatically repre-
sented speaker intentions onto a forma speakermaywish touse to express that in-
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tention. In this way, then, language forms are assigned to the semanto-pragmatic
functions they help to implement linguistically. Crucially, the existence of such
formal expressions of functions is not denied (unlike in extreme functional theo-
ries, cf. below).Maybe it does not come as a surprise, then, thatmany of the issues
wehavepointed above for formally oriented grammars and conservative function-
ally oriented grammars will constitute problems for moderate functional gram-
mars as well: For example, the notorious scope ambiguity of English is represen-
tative of the fact that this facet of sentence-level semantics is not easily expressed
in many types of constructions, which nevertheless have to be taken as “expres-
sions” of the two relevant readings, if only ambiguously so. The question arises,
therefore, why there is a mismatch between scopal semantics and at least these
kinds of expressions. Moderate functional grammars could expect that there is an
expression rule that helps express semantic argument status. In many languages,
word orders and/or case markings can be taken to constitute such expressions
of argument status. Here, too, mismatches between semanto-pragmatic function
and formal expression are easy to point out. In German, it ismainly the casemark-
ing aspect of the form system that helps hearers identify which argument phrases
have which semantic roles to carry out, because word order in German is rather
free, and often offers no reliable clue as to the roles of argument phrases. How-
ever, with many types of phrases, and for many case, number and gender spec-
ifications, the semanto-pragmatic function is in fact obscured in German. Case











‘The cats see the women.’ or ‘The women see the cats.’
This case reflects the fact that case distinctions are almost completely neutralized
for verbal arguments that are plural in German.5 For proper names, which never
inflect for argument cases, this is the general state of affairs in the language:6
5 For dative, accusative and nominative arguments, which are productive in the language, no
case-marking distinctions are found in the plural. However, an extremely small number of verbs
takes internal arguments in the genitive (e. g., gedenken ‘to commemorate’). These arguments
can be identified morphologically as internal arguments, since the genitive is morphologically
marked even in the plural. However, this case-marking pattern has zero productivity in German,
and the few last verbs that fall in the pattern are a select few, and probably on the decline di-
achronically any way.
6 Again, proper names canmark genitive case overtly, but genitive case is not a productive argu-
ment case – but only found in nominal contexts, expressing possessor status or argument status
vis-à-vis the nominal head of an NP.







‘Fritz sees Franz.’ or ‘Franz sees Fritz.’
In languages like English, argument status is encodedmostly byword order, since
the only overt case marking left is the genitive (which is not a verbal argument
case). Arguments that come to precede finite verbal elements and negation are
generally subject arguments. While this works fine for a majority of cases, there
also exist dummy subjects. In formal terms, these occupy the prenominal posi-
tion like subjects (in fact, block it for other phrases), but cannot reasonably be
described to help express subject arguments semantically, while other phrases,
now blocked from the subject position, could and should. In the following ex-
ample (13-a), the semantic subject (the agent of running) would have to be a
man, but the phrase does not appear in subject position, given the word order.
In fact, given the presence of the expletive subject there, the semantically plau-
sible subject, a man, cannot come to take up the subject position, (13-b) and
(13-c).
(13) a. There is a man running around in the garden.
b. *a man there is running in the garden
c. *there a man is running in the garden7
Similarly, if verb agreement is taken to be functional (in that it helps hearers iden-
tify subjects), mismatches arise again, when verbal agreement fails to point to-
wards the phrases that are arguably the subjects of clauses, as in the following
examples.8









(verbs agree with nom. subject)









(verbs do not agree with dat. subject)
‘I am cold.’ ‘We are cold.’
7 This sentence is not to be confused with a similar-sounding sentence with the (homophonous)
left-peripheral local adverbial there, i. e.: There, aman is running in the garden. The two sentences
are prosodically different, as is the interpretation of theword there: “Dummy”-there, e. g., is com-
patible with other local adverbials which would be semantically contradictory vis-à-vis the local
adverbial there: There’s a man here. Given these differences in both prosody and semantics, the
two structures should be kept apart.
8 Abbreviations: dat – dative; nom – nominative; pl – plural; sg –singular; 1 – first person.
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Again, then, some semantic similarities are assigned different formal treat-
ments, (14-b) and (14-c), or else formal distinctions typically used to signal func-
tional differences may not be applied consistently across the board in all con-
structions in a language (14-a). In cases such as (14-b) and (14-c), particularly, a
semantic property that is readily expressible in the language (as with the nomi-
native examples), can also receive a formal expression that fails to carry out the
alleged expressive function (in the dative cases9). In sum, grammars that attempt
to map semanto-pragmatic functions onto formal expressions will face very simi-
lar problems as the formal(ist) models we discussed above: Some distinctions on
some levels (say, argument roles in the examples just discussed) are not matched
upwith isomorphic distinctions on another level representation (word order, case
marking, and agreement, in our examples).
This leaves the type of functional theories that Van Valin (2001: 150) char-
acterizes as “extreme”. In these kinds of theories, the existence of any type of
structure-building operations of any generality is denied – for the simple reason
that structures of any generality are denied in the first place (Hopper 1987). In
these theories, consequently, even a notion like “compositional interpretation” is
rejected, since there can be no formal means of expression that would systemati-
cally represent such meanings via linguistic forms. The only form-meaning pair-
ings such extreme functionalist theories accept are idiosyncratic by definition,
and may not even have any long-term stability: They are argued to be the sub-
ject of constant re-negotiations (of their meanings) in discourses (Hopper 1987).
Now, it may seem as though the questions we raise above are not formulable in
extreme functionalist theories. However, it seems to us thatmaybe even these the-
ories would have to discuss our questions, too, if only from the opposite perspec-
tive. Whereas we ask “which mismatches exist between subcomponents of gram-
mar?”, they would still have to ask “are there really no matches between forms
and meanings (other than what is found for individual constructions, used by in-
dividual speakers, in individual contexts)?”.
It seems, therefore, as if the question why grammars show unregulated, in-
determinate, or mismatched aspects is not the result of some specific theoretical
choice. In every theory we are aware of, similar questions arise somewhere, and
no grammatical theory seems to address every aspect of linguistic forms and func-
tions equally (let alone perfectly) coherently and elegantly.We therefore feel justi-
fied to submit that answers to the questions we pose are required, independently
9 Also, argumentswith other cases cannot agreewith verbs, and sentential subjects donot agree,
either.
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of theoretical choices. The present volume is an attempt to start a process of find-
ing some answers to these fundamental questions.
2 Can we pose our questions meaningfully – or
will the answers only ever be circular?
There are, of course, many problems with posing fundamental questions such as
the ones we outlined in Section 1:
– Dowe have any a priori expectations as towhich aspects of structure building
the subcomponents have to address? Are these a priori expectations in any
way justified?
– Why would grammars produce mismatches, leave pertinent aspects of lan-
guage unregulated, or fail to resolve sufficient detail in indeterminate cases;
and since grammars are meant to represent how forms and meanings match
up, which aspects are the mapping are regulated, and how?
– Conversely, are we not just restating our axiomatic assumptions about gram-
matical subcomponents, coupledwith the sad admission that all our efforts to
come up with formal descriptions of such subcomponents are simply lacking
in coherence and sophistication?
In this section, we want to argue that the questions we pose are not admissions of
failure, nor do they reflect just how poorly the discipline of linguistics has tackled
the analysis of form-meaning mappings.
We do not subscribe to a pessimistic world view, where the differentiation of
grammatical subcomponents boils down to a just so story about languages, which
may appear tidy, but is in fact entirely stipulative. On the contrary, many of the
subcomponents commonly postulated in the history of linguistics have been sup-
ported quite convincingly, and by various,mutually supportive kinds of evidence.
Theoretically, the rules and operations that have been demonstrated to suc-
cessfully model syntactic phenomena are not all too similar to rules, operations
or structures from phonology, after all. Also, while compositional semantics can
be closely associated with formal structural means of expression, it still stands to
reason that the expressed meaning and its formal expression are still fundamen-
tally different entities ontologically, and their respective theoretical representa-
tions show it. By identifying which formal inventories seem similar to (or demon-
strably different from) each other, we identify groupings of mechanisms, opera-
tions, etc., which outline grammatical subcomponents non-circularly, we believe.
Labels for the groupings (like syntax andmorphology)maynot carrymuchweight
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empirically, but formal similarities between some operations, and differences be-
tweenothers, cannot beoverlooked in the studyof languages, and lead to apicture
that is, despite many remaining questions, largely coherent.
The separations of levels is neither an easy task, nor are the specific sepa-
rations uncontroversial. From a logical, or modeling point of view, various ar-
guments have shown that morphological and syntactic subcomponents share
enough similarities to warrant the question whether they constitute a single,
overarching structure component of grammar, which concerns itself with the
construction of meaning-bearing structures both large (syntax) and small (mor-
phology). We also find, conversely, that the differences between morphology and
syntax never quite go away, at least not in all languages and regarding all data
points. We would like to submit, therefore, that both the postulation of a gram-
mar comprisingmorphology and syntax, aswell as the possible subdifferentiation
between the two levels of descriptions have argumentative support. Also, subd-
ifferentiating morphology into word formation and inflectional components has
been shown to have beneficial consequences for theories trying to model mor-
phological phenomena (even though strong lexicalist positions may deny this, of
course). Subdividing syntax intomore semantically oriented sub-subcomponents
(say, core syntax, in modern Chomskyan terms) and more surface-oriented sub-
subcomponents (themapping to PF in the same family of theories) has opened up
interesting possibilities (and problems) for the description of syntactic structures.
Ultimately, we find that the question of whether specific subcomponents exist is a
question of the granularity of the description. Ismorphology distinct from syntax?
From a bird’s eye perspective, no. But from the point of view of higher resolution
descriptions (at least for some cases, in some languages), possibly yes. Whether
morphology and syntax are used as the names of subcomponents that handle
these phenomena, or whether we insist that these distinctions are just reflective
of small-scale syntax vs. large-scale syntax seems to be an entirely empty dis-
cussion, concerned more with naming than substance. Other distinctions, for
example between lexicon and syntax have also been disputed (Fried and Boas
2005; Hoffman and Trousdale 2016; Johnson and Postal 1980). Other differen-
tiations have never, to our knowledge, been called into question. No theory we
know tries to conflate phonology and semantics, or other, equally incommensu-
rable levels of linguistic description. Thus, even though the precise definition of
levels may still be disputed, the usefulness of some such distinctions has been
demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, we maintain.
From a neuro- and psycholinguistic perspective, it has often been pointed out
that at least some subcomponents that have proven helpful for theoretical pur-
poses may, in fact, have independent support from the observation of process-
ing operations, and/or phenomena associated with language loss. The literature
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is replete with such connections, so we will only touch upon them very selec-
tively here. To give one example from the processing literature, it is clear that
violations of linguistic expectations do not seem to be indistinguishably similar
to each other. On the contrary, it is well established that event-related potentials
like a P600 in the posterior temporal lobe are associated with violations of for-
mal linguistic properties (like syntactic violations). It is also, of course, clear that
brain regions are not single-purpose devices. P600 effects have been proposed to
also be caused by musical stimuli which violate certain structural expectations
(Patel et al. 1998), as well as by syntactic violations resulting from anomalous
filler-gap dependencies (a competence-related phenomenon) to issues having to
do with the processing of garden-path structures (a performance issue). How-
ever, it still seems reasonable to point out that these violations are of a formal,
or minimally form-related nature. They can, despite all internal differentiations,
be kept apart frommore semantics-related ERP effects, such as the N400 type (Ku-
tas and Hillyard 1980, and much subsequent literature). While not every subdivi-
sion proposed for the purposes of theoretical modeling has been found reflected
in psycho- or neurolinguistic observations, the overall picture, it seems to us, is
still mostly one of compatibility (or even consilience, in the sense of Wilson 1999)
between the different approaches to describing language structures and their pro-
cessing. Somephenomena associatedwith language loss seem to selectively affect
faculties that would belong to specific theoretical subcomponents (given the defi-
nitions of that subcomponent by some theory), but leaveother faculties fromother
subcomponents intact (like the lexicon). This further corroborates the impression
that theoretical subdistinctions – while not perfectly replicated in all their detail
– seem to make some sense, at least in their rough outlines. If these observations
from the linguistic literature are on the right track, then a differentiation into cog-
nitively and neurologically real subcomponents of grammars seems a plausible
assumption.
Ultimately, even when no independent support for some subcomponent has
(yet) been offered, we can remind ourselves that the postulation of the subcompo-
nent may, in the worst case, still constitute an interesting hypothesis about how
language(s) could be organized on a purely abstract level. This holds even when
the hypothesis subsequently leads to discoveries that make the subcomponent
implausible, for independent reasons. However, as long as the hypotheses are
not contradicted by independent research, they constitute valid proposals, and
as such help drive research developments to fill in the blank spots we only know
exist because we have posited our hypotheses clearly to begin with.
Nothing of what we have said so far is intended to mean that we deny the
possibility of future surprises, especially when our theories are confronted with
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data from hitherto understudied languages. On the contrary, we positively ex-
pect that the investigation of more typologically diverse languages will unearth
findings that would not have been expected given even themost thorough investi-
gation of, say, East Coast American English. However, interesting as those future
developments will certainly be, we are not currently expecting to see surprises of
arbitrary magnitude. While cross-linguistic empirical research has demonstrated
that languages differ with regard to the inventory of lexical and/or syntactic cate-
gories (Sasse 1993; Wunderlich 1996), it does not seem rational to be holding our
breaths for the discovery of a language that makes absolutely no distinctions at
all with regards to members of its lexical inventory of atoms of meaning or struc-
ture. Semantically, we would, as a discipline, be shocked to find that a certain
language makes no use of function-argument pairings, as found in predicate-
argument type structures (and many similar semantic constellations). We do
not expect languages that have a finite set of calls (meaning-bearing, but non-
compositional, atomic units of communication), despite the fact that such call
systems are the only communicative inventory available to our closest biological
relatives amongst primates. Grammatically speaking, languages which have no
potential for creative structure-building (which could be used to formally express
an unbounded array of meanings) would be similarly shocking to find. Overall,
then, in this way, too, linguistics has established a body of knowledge that many
practitioners will expect not be overthrown overnight.
However, while such extremely unexpected findingsmay not arise, questions
about the internal organization of grammatical architectures are still interesting
next questions to ask: If, after all is said and done, languages do show some sim-
ilarities in their mappings from forms to meanings, the question still arises how
“hi-fi” such mappings, in fact, are. Which types of mismatched, indeterminate,
or unregulated aspects can be found in individual languages – and how do they
compare cross-linguistically?
From a purely theoretical point of view, we readily admit, it could be con-
sidered surprising, at least a priori, that there should ever be “lo-fi” grammatical
mappings in the first place. Grammars are systems that handle possiblemappings
from linguistic forms tomeanings. Toput this evenmorebluntly, grammars simply
are not observable systems that have any ontological status except as the systems
representing such mappings. It thus may be slightly paradoxical to ask whether
grammars in fact produce mismatches. And it may seem impossible to point out
such mismatches. However, given our presentation above, we find that, at least
with the theoretical proposals established so far, it seems that the mismatches
pop up again and again, despite our best efforts as a discipline. Why is this?
To immediately make a completely opposite argument, maybe we should not
be surprised to findmismatches, givenwhat itmeans tomap forms ontomeanings.
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Meanings represent the mappings of some kinds of complex (and at least poten-
tially extra-linguistic) cognitive objects (vulgo “thoughts”) onto linearly ordered,
rule-governed arrangements of atomic units, after all (according to all but the ex-
treme functionalist grammars). Given the incommensurable nature of these two
interface objects, a lossless mapping could probably not be expected, even with
great optimism. Any conceivable mapping device that relates these ontologically
different objects would no doubt have to make drastic changes to some represen-
tations on some levels of descriptions. In fact, the mapping mechanism that lan-
guage grammars seek to supply has to be lossy and fundamentallymismatched in
some ways – namely to the precise degree that we believe the ontological objects
mapped onto each other to be incommensurable.
Of course, some proposals try to overcome some of the translational burden
between such incomparable cognitive objects by denying that the two levels of
representation are separated to such a degree. Take the proposal of a language
of thought (Fodor 1975, 2008). If thoughts (at least the propositional thoughts
of philosophical tradition) would turn out to be generated by an essentially
language-like system, the syntax-meaning interface could be conceived of as
basically lossless. As we have seen above, some current syntactic proposals see
no real reason to assume that a semantic component should exist independently
from the syntactic component that generates meanings. For example, Chomsky
argues (in sharp contradistinction to, e. g., Dowty 1979; Jackendoff 1972) that
“[most] of what’s called ‘semantics’ is, in my opinion, syntax. It is the part of
syntax that is presumably close to the interface system that involves the use of
language. So there is that part of syntax and there certainly is pragmatics in
some general sense of what you do with words and so on. But whether there is
semantics in the more technical sense is an open question. I don’t think there’s
any reason to believe that there is.” (Chomsky 2000: 74) Therefore, syntax may
interface with extra-linguistic cognitive faculties, but not with a semantic sub-
component in the technical sense. Given Fodor’s language of thought, the addi-
tional question arises what language-external cognition even consists of, or at
least which language-external elements of cognition are linguistically express-
ible (since only “propositional thoughts” may be) at all. However, some authors
have argued (supported by extremely interesting philosophical arguments and
ingenious experiments) that the syntactic algorithms homo sapiens seems to em-
ploy to express aspects of meaning, and the species’ knack for complex thoughts
could still turn out to rely on the very same cognitive mechanism (Hinzen 2011;
Hyde et al. 2011; Shusterman et al. 2011; Spelke 2003; Spelke and Tsivkin 2001).
Maybe even more so than with the language of thought, shifting our view of what
the syntactic machinery is could do away with much complexity at the interface
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between syntactic and semantic aspects, since there is no interface, and few dis-
tinctions between the systems. Under this “functionalism in reverse” perspective,
languages do not express meanings which conform to a priori and language-
external thoughts. Instead, this still relatively new direction of inquiry proposes
that the mechanisms that underlie language may, in fact, be the same mecha-
nisms that allow us to have thoughts in the first place (at least for certain types
of complex, propositional thoughts), upending many of the conceptions we have
discussed above completely. But no matter how this chicken or egg type of dis-
cussionmay play out, shifting our conceptions around in this way will not render
thoughts and forms that express thoughts indistinguishable, of course. Formal
andmeaning/thought-related aspects of linguistic or general cognitive structures
will have to be kept apart, as reflected in the different ways that individual lan-
guages still uncontroversially supply different translations from thoughts into
expressions.
To sum up this section, we propose that some mappings between forms and
either meanings or thoughts of some type to be determined, will stay with us.
Thus, the need to investigate the architecture of the mapping device remains an
issue. Which interfaces are required between which subcomponents, and which
tasks are unregulated or indeterminate in these components is a question that can
be meaningfully asked regardless.
3 Previous works on similar questions
As the last section has established, we think that the questions we try to ask
here are interesting and fundamental to our discipline. Luckily, the present vol-
ume finds itself in a historical context where similar questions have already
been asked, and most of the groundwork is thus already laid for our discussion.
The following developments in the field were therefore not only influential for
kick-starting our project, they also developed many of the tools, techniques and
conceptions of language that we and the authors in this volume rely on.
One such older development is the long-standing (and ultimately unresolved)
discussion about the functional underpinnings of grammars already discussed
above.While nobodydenies that languages areused for communication, opinions
still differ as to whether grammars (more specifically, grammatical rules or oper-
ations) are brought about by functional considerations, and whether they have
communicative functions as their sole raison d’être. It is clear why this question
is still open. While many good functional explanations can be found for many
formal phenomena across languages’ grammars, mismatches between forms and
Indeterminacies and mismatches | 257
meanings are also still found, and also across most or all known languages, it
seems. For many rules and operations that seem reasonable to posit from a for-
malist point of view, no functional explanation seems readily available.While the
discussion may not be finished for now, the mismatches that have been pointed
out to exist between formal structures and semanto-pragmatic functions of such
structures have planted in us the doubt that languages are “hi-fi” systems for
the meaning-form mapping. If they were, functionalist conceptions of grammar
should easily, and unequivocally have won the debate, we assume.
It is also certainly no coincidence, then, that generative syntactic models in
the Chomskyan tradition never shied away from postulating syntactic structures
and operations that made a lot of sense from a purely formal perspective, but
which upon even the most superficial inspection could potentially cause mis-
matches. Early generative models almost routinely made proposals that could
not easily be matched up with semantic findings (lest the structures could look
too functionalist). In later developments (certainly in the so-called Minimalist
Program), the syntactic machinery is extremely closely aligned with sentence-
level meaning aspects of clause structures. However, not coincidentally, there
must now be additional formal systems that map the outputs of syntactic deriva-
tions onto phonological representations which speakers would recognize as the
forms of sentences. These mapping devices are not functionalist in nature, in
fact they may not even be fully systematic across languages in the first place.
Over the course of the development of Chomskyan generative grammars, then,
at least two fault lines were standardly assumed, in varying constellations. Syn-
tax has to interface with a semantic subcomponent (call it LF) and a surface
form-oriented component (call it PF), to combine atomic elements from another
grammatically independent subcomponent, the mental lexicon. No completely
lossless mapping between these interfacing systems was ever assumed. In the
Y-model of generative syntax in the 1980s and early 1990s, the LF branch of
the derivation represented mismatches between observed word orders and in-
terpretative effects such as scopal interpretations or binding options. In more
current models, the PF branch becomes a messy affair, responsible for repre-
senting many mismatches between forms and meanings. For example, the mis-
matches between scope and word order already discussed above were handled as
LF-movements in the older Y-model, but were then represented as overt but invis-
ible movements, i. e. as PF-regulated spellouts of low copies of multiply merged
elements.
In sum, therefore, Chomskyan generative grammar never conceived of the
mapping from sentential semantics to forms as lossless, it was only the precise
way where and how the mismatches were represented that changed. Other gram-
mars have to make similar choices.
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Another influence on our thinking we would like to acknowledge here is a
question that does not concern itself as much with architectural questions, such
as the interfaces between subcomponents, but rather asks whether operations
and structures could be flawed internally to some individual subsystems of the
grammar, too. For example, discussions can be found in the literaturewhether we
should not consider grammatical systems that generate mismatches much more
frequently – and maybe even fruitfully – than had previously been assumed:
In an edited volume, Brandt and Fuß compile articles that address the pos-
sibilities of (and potential necessity for) Repairs (Brandt and Fuß 2013b). The au-
thors of this volume assume that grammatical operations on some level of de-
scription can generate structures that could be considered problematic in some
respects, but which ultimately “can be put to service to economically code inter-
pretations that are difficult or even perhaps impossible to express transparently”
(Brandt and Fuß 2013a: 9). Brandt and Fuß, in turn, acknowledge that their own
thoughts follow from older works like Reinhart (2006), and point out various lin-
guistic phenomenawhichmay show repairs atwork.We refer our reader to Brandt
and Fuß’ very interesting thoughts, which we need not replicate here.
There may arise the impression that the picture of grammars we are paint-
ing here could stand in contradiction to other concepts of language, which con-
sider languages to constitute perfect solutions to the issue of mapping thoughts
onto expressions. For example, the strong minimalist thesis (SMT, Chomsky 2005,
2007) claims that grammars should constitute “an optimal way to link sound and
meaning” (Chomsky 2008: 135). Brandt and Fuß explicitly position their concep-
tion of repairs relatively explicitly as an alternative to the SMT. Somewhat sim-
ilarly (but against a completely different conceptual background), functionally
oriented grammars will want to argue that formal expressions mimic semanto-
pragmatic functions relatively transparently, for the simple reason that the formal
mechanisms are supposed to express communicative functions by definition. We
believe, however, that the questions we ask (and the conception of language they
presuppose) stand in no fundamental opposition to either of these assumptions.
As regards the SMT, it is near-impossible to define what constitutes an optimal
link between forms andmeanings, a point that Chomsky himself discussed many
times. We submit here that the individual operations a Chomskyan grammar pro-
vides could be optimally simple, but that, at the same time, the structures gen-
erated by such operations could prove problematic, as well as the ways in which
these outputs of syntax are passed on to, and handled in, other, non-syntactic
subcomponents of the grammatical architecture. Similarly, functionalist tenets
(at least in conservative or moderate functional grammars, adopting Van Valin’s
terminology) about the semanto-pragmatic transparency of grammars can bemet
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in general, even if turns out that not every intermediate representation or gram-
matical factor involved in the mapping is without its complexities or (perhaps:
necessary) contradictions. In this way, we do not think that our topic constitutes
any issue a priori for any of the overarching ways we use to conceptualize lan-
guage, grammar, etc., andwedo not intend for it to argue againstwell-established
conceptions directly.
Leaving such overarching questions behind, we find that many well-known
concrete phenomena are representative of the kinds of mismatches in linguis-
tic architectures we want to talk about. We will now present some of those well-
known cases in turn.
Lexical ambiguity and the sheer availability (or absence) of lexical atoms in
languages are sources for various types of mismatches. While lexical inventories
might seem like a phenomenon that is different from the interplay of grammati-
cal subcomponents, we believe it may be fruitful to consider the way in which the
lexicon integrates into the array of more centrally grammatical (i. e., non-lexical)
subcomponents. This is not only necessary, in view of the fact that this very dis-
tinction itself has come under close scrutiny by construction-based approaches.
How the lexicon is conceived of, and formally connected to the grammatical sub-
components, matters for many other approaches to syntax and morphology, too,
as we show now.
On the one hand, in a lexicalist conception of Chomskyan generative gram-
mar, lexical items (LIs) constitute ready-made building blocks, which drive syn-
tactic composition unidirectionally. Syntax has to respect lexical properties (satu-
rate argument roles of predicates, fulfill selectional requirements and restrictions,
etc.) as well as morpho-syntactically relevant properties like agreement features,
which enter the syntactic component(s) fully specified. In this way, mismatches
between the lexicon and the grammatical components are maybe not expected to
occur a lot – since the lexicon basically dictates which lexical aspects the gram-
matical components will have to respect.
On the other hand, compare this with how an a priori lexicon plays out when
no lexicalist morphology is assumed. For example, in Distributed Morphology
(DM) stored lexical items are inserted at a late step in the derivation. This leads to
an interface between the lexicon and the structure component that is again char-
acterized by a potential for mismatches. For in DM, the structural computation
carried out by the grammatical subcomponents operates over feature bundles
which are spelled out by lexical items only after the point of lexical insertion. At
this point in a derivation, various types of mismatches can arise. In the simplest
case, different feature bundles arrived at by the derivation can be lexicalized ei-
ther by items that perfectlymatch the feature bundles or else by items that do not.
In a competition between items that could potentially lexicalize feature bundles
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for which no perfectly matching item can be supplied, suboptimal candidates
for insertion can end up the winners of the competition for insertion. Items that
enter the competition with the largest subset of the required feature set can be
inserted even if their feature specification does not really express the structurally
required feature set. This, of course, introduces a mismatch between the type of
structure that is fed to the semantic component, and to the surface form com-
ponent, respectively. Syntactic structures can be mapped onto available lexical
items in a lossyway. Therefore, various syntactic feature bundles can be imagined
for which the optimal candidate for lexical insertion is one and the same lexical
item. Consequently, syntactically available distinctions are not found replicated
in the structure that has all lexical items inserted. Themismatch for such theories,
then, is placed at the point of lexical insertion.
Alternatively, DM provides mechanisms for changing the constellation found
for the lexical insertion process. With fusion, nodes that constitutedmultiple syn-
tactic heads for the syntactic derivation, are turned into a single feature set for the
purposes of lexical insertion. Given this operation, the lexical insertion competi-
tion may play out differently – but now, a mismatch is created between syntac-
tic derivations that handle one or more than one head, and the lexical insertion
process which cannot replicate the distinction between the two syntactic constel-
lations, given fusion. Similarly, the operation of fission splits up syntactic heads,
so that now, the lexical insertion process makes a distinction between cases after
fission has applied (multiple insertion competitions take place) and cases where
fission has not applied (one insertion) that is not replicated in the structure gen-
erated by the syntactic derivation. Similar arguments can bemade for impoverish-
ment, lowering, dislocation, and potentially other DM operations.
Since the lexicon that supplies candidates for insertion is to some degree
language-specific, we arrive at a situation where some language L may carry out
mismatch-inducing DM operations, whereas another language L will not do so. If
the output sentences of L and L are, however, equivalent in meaning, it becomes
apparent that fusion, fission, etc. are operations that create mismatches between
sentence-semantic interpretations, and options for expressing such meanings
formally.
Turning to what may be a more uncontroversial case, structural ambiguity is
a quintessential example of the kinds of mismatches we have in mind: There is
one surface form (somewords in some order, potentially characterized by specific
prosodic properties), but the mapping of this surface form to syntactic represen-
tations must fork out into two different structural constellations, with different
structural properties, and semantic interpretations. To discuss but one example
of this well-known phenomenon, a sentence such as we decided on the boat can
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be analyzed with the PP on the boat either as a local adverbial, or else as a com-
plement of the verb decide, causing the differences in semantic interpretation.
It becomes apparent, therefore, that there is a mismatch in English between the
syntactic component (which differentiates between the two configurations) and
the subcomponent concerned with deriving the surface form of structures (which
does not).
Given the examples discussed so far, the question arises whethermismatches
are limited to the interface between the grammatical subcomponents and some
surface-oriented component. We do not believe that this is the case. Rather, a dif-
ferent, but ultimately comparable scenario can play out at the interface between
the grammatical subcomponents and the semantic interface. In a phenomenon
called spurious ambiguity (Karttunen 1989; Steedman 1991; Pankau et al. 2010),
the syntax supplies two structures, but the semantic component will not reflect













‘Who has she seen, do you think?’ (interpretation of both b and c)
b. Wen [glaubst Du] hat sie gesehen? = parenthetical
c. Wen glaubst Du [wen hat sie gesehen]? = extraction
The structure in (15-b) was proposed as a parenthetical analysis of the sentence
in (15-a). The structure in (15-c) was proposed as an analysis that employs the
syntactic extraction of the wh-phrase from the subordinate clause. Both analyses
receive great amounts of support, and both seem needed to explain the various
properties and restrictions that hold for clauses of this type. It has not been pos-
sible, at least to date, to propose a single analysis that explains all properties.
Consider, now, that this state of affairs is not caused by our lack of imagination
for such solutions, but actually constitutes an empirical fact of German. In that
case, structures of this type reflect mismatches in the sense we are interested in
here: The semantic component is incapable of assigning different meanings to
two different syntactic constellations. This finding will no doubt make some lin-
guists shrug, since the constellation of (multiple) structural options for a (single)
interpretation seems innocuous, from the point of view of the communicative ex-
pression of thoughts. As long as there are ways to explain the mappings from all
possible meanings of the relevant structure to surface forms they associate with,
certainly no harm is done. From a more formal point, however, we submit that a
distinction the structure-forming component can make cannot be replicated by
the subcomponent that interprets the structures derived. We are thus potentially
looking at another case of mismatch that relates to our questions.
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Another harmless fact about many languages is that they can represent a sin-
gle meaning via distinguishable surface forms. Some linguists tend to argue that
there simply must be differences in meaning associated with the different struc-
tures [and such linguists are found in both the functionally minded as well as the
formal camp, e. g. in syntactic cartography; for some criticisms, cf. Struckmeier
2014, 2017, 2020]. While we do not want to pre-judge whether different meanings
of distinguishable forms will be observed at some point in the future, we must
not fail to point out that such meaning distinctions are clearly not readily per-
ceivable (at least for the time being). In German, a syntactic phenomenon called
scrambling can permutate the order of arguments and adverbials in the so-called
middle field of the German clause, as in:
(16) a. Heute hat Peter den Kindern die Kekse hinter der Scheune gegeben.























‘Today, Peter gave the cookies to the kids behind the barn.’
The meaning given in the gloss is not only the meaning of the examples (16)), but
alsomaterializes for the various other permutations the arguments and the adver-
bial can be found (which are almost unrestricted: all conceivable 4! = 24 orders
are possible). Truth-functionally, all of these different orders seem to be equiva-
lent. If there is any difference in meaning associated with these sentences at all,
they are found in the domain of information structure. For example, discourse-
oldmaterials are preferably positioned before discourse-new (or maybe, stressed)
materials. However, this does not necessarily make scrambled structures differ-
entiated meaning-wise, even if meaning is construed in such a wide way as to
include information structural effects. Firstly, no one-to-one mapping between
scrambling constellations and information structural effects can be posited, de-
spite much efforts in this direction (Struckmeier 2014, 2020). Secondly, there are
sentences which simply fail to even only show an information structural differ-
ence in the first place. Consider the two answers (17-b) and (17-c) for the question
in (17-a).
(17) a. Q:Who did you give the money to?















‘I have given the money to the waiter.’
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The two sentences in (17-b) and (17-c) are absolutely, completely and demonstra-
bly identical in sentence-level semantic meaning: Not a single situation can be
construed where one of the two sentences would be false while the other sen-
tence would be true. Since the two sentences therefore fail to meet Cresswell’s
minimal standard for what constitutes difference in meaning, any difference in
interpretations would have to be information structural in nature. However, the
two sentences are legitimate answers to the same question, as the example just
given shows. More generally, we challenge anybody to come up with a context in
which (17-b) is an acceptable answer, and (17-c) is not.10 If no such context can
be found, it seems hard to argue that (17-b) and (17-c) differ in their information
structural meaning. Since their truth-functional sentence-level meaning is iden-
tical, we would be hard-pressed to consider (17-b) and (17-c) as anything but iden-
tical with regard to every aspect of their meaning, even where meaning is widely
construed. This, then, leads to a situation, where the semantic component cannot
differentiate between (17-b) and (17-c), but the structure-forming components that
implement the word order difference can. German, thus, has redundant mecha-
nisms to implement meanings in every case where scrambling options are avail-
able that do not result in meaning differences.11 Such redundancy, then, is some-
what comparable to spurious ambiguities, in that the meaning system(s) cannot
differentiate between structures that some structure-forming component(s) can
(and must) be able to keep apart. Similar arguments have also been made for the
operation(s) that implement the distribution of elements in the so-called pre-field
of German, i. e. the position preceding the finite verb in a V2 clause: Here, too,
different placements of phrases in the pre-field may or may not result in (demon-
strably) different meanings, as reflected in the fact that, in generative treatments,
pre-field movements have almost exclusively been considered as A-movements.
From a theoretical point, what makes redundancy interesting is primarily the
fact that it creates loci for optionality. Scrambling options remain even when se-
mantic, pragmatic, discourse-structural, prosodic and, in fact, virtually all con-
ceivable other factors for reigning in the optionality have been drawn upon to no
avail. In thisway,whenwefind redundantways ofmappings formsontomeanings
(even widely construed), we find that the language system is not as deterministic
as some approaches to grammar seem to assume. The set of such approaches run
orthogonally to well-established fault lines in the field. Cartographic approaches
10 Wehasten to exclude from this challenge caseswhere speakers are asked to recite either (17-b)
or (17-c) verbatim, so that the sentences’ form itself is at issue, rather than their meaning.
11 Clearly, such cases (or uses?) of scrambling exist, too: See, e. g. Struckmeier (2014; 2017) for a
compilation of semantically relevant and semantically ineffective cases of scrambling.
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to syntax have a strong tendency to try and rule out optionality (since optionality
threatens to provide an alternative to the feature-driven, deterministic operations
cartography deals in). Similarly, but against a completely different background,
functionalist theories try and tie the existence of different forms to differentmean-
ings the forms (are supposed to) express, but theywill find it difficult to accept that
some formal mechanisms do not seem to cater to such a neat mapping from forms
to functions.
The existence of formal redundancy also seems interesting from a psycholin-
guistic point of view, as well, since redundancy arguably makes it harder for chil-
dren to acquire a language: Firstly, and most trivially, multiple forms require a
higher learning effort than a single form. Secondly, distinctions that are not tied
to semantic differences may be harder to learn, since children seem to learn for-
mal distinctions better and more easily when they are tied to differences in in-
terpretation. Thirdly, from a more statistical perspective, the mere existence of
alternative expressions should lead to differences for learnability. Given alterna-
tive forms to express a singlemeaning, each individual synonymous sentence can
only ever be lower in frequency, given the (respective) alternatives adult speakers
may choose to express that meaning. While we cannot gauge howmuchmore dif-
ficult redundancy would make language acquisition, it stands to reason that it
certainly does not help the process. Given that no functional effect is achieved by
redundancy (given that the alternative forms express the same meaning by def-
inition), we would like to point out that this mismatch seems in need of some
explanation.
4 How important are the mismatches – i. e., how
does “language” handle them?
As we have just seen, various types of mismatches, indeterminacies, and unreg-
ulated phenomena are already well known from the literature. In this section,
we would like to argue that there are, at least potentially, much more loci in our
current theoretical architectures that could be suspected to bring forth similar
mismatches: In many theories of language, the notion of grammar has been de-
composed into a multitude of subsystems in the available literature. We are thus
in a situation where more interfaces between these more deconstructed subcom-
ponents exist than in older theories. Consequently, more interfaces than just,
say, the one between “syntax and semantics”, or similar “large-scale” subcom-
ponents have to be attended to. Each of these interfaces would seem to have a
certain potential for mismatches like the ones we have spoken about. Therefore,
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the questions we have posed above would have to be re-investigated with regard
to such newer architectures, with their increased division of labor: Can we find
mismatches akin to structural ambiguity, spurious ambiguity, redundancy, etc. at
each of these interfaces? This is currently very much an open question, but one
which we think can be addressed with fruitful results.
As soon as we are in a position to see which mismatches exist between the
subcomponents a theory under discussion displays, we can ask an important
follow-up question: How does the proposed language architecture handle the
mismatches, wherever they may occur? There are several guesses we could easily
venture from the top of our heads, currently all without much empirical evidence
to support them. In order to give an idea of which more concrete venues for
research exist, consider the following (open) questions:
– Do grammars impose (arbitrary) restrictionswhich remove themismatches by
fiat?Maybe this does not seemplausible, sincewe still find somemismatches.
However, we could imagine that grammars produce more mismatches than
the ones we see. And the ones we see are characterized by certain properties,
which those mismatches lack that have been removed.
– Could functional systems come to piggyback on the optionalities that are
left open by formal grammatical systems? That is, could options left open by
a formal system of grammar be exploited functionally, by assigning mean-
ings to the different formal options, maybe in a diachronic cultural pro-
cess, or more liberally in the context of discourses (borrowing at least a
fraction of the assumptions made by extreme functionalism, e. g. Emergent
Grammar)? This option does not seem to far-fetched, in fact: For example,
some authors at least have proposed that information structure exploits
word order options in German scrambling. The different word orders avail-
able in the German middle field thus do not strictly express information
structural distinctions (like case markings helps express argument status).
Rather, some authors assume (Bayer and Kornfilt 1994; Haider this volume;
Fanselow 2001, 2003; Struckmeier 2014, 2017) that the grammar treats the
word order as truly optional choices. But the use of these optionally avail-
able structures can still reflect discourse distinctions, maybe also in connec-
tion with the prosodic markings that also go into the computation of such
discourse-related requirements. Similarly, some authors have argued (Féry
2008) that prosody is not a system that would express information structural
distinctions with any level of accuracy or determinism. Rather, information
structural distinctions can piggyback on independently available prosodic
options. In this volume, the article by Haider presents thoughts along these
lines.
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– Alternatively, do conventions arise in speaker communities to the effect
that languages are only used in such a way that the usage of mismatch-
demonstrating structures is avoided, despite the fact that such structures
are, strictly speaking, grammatical? This would be at least somewhat remi-
niscent of an idea proposed by Newmeyer (2005) that grammars provide an
option space for what is structurally possible in languages, but that func-
tional considerations whittle away from such option spaces all structural
options that are not functional. In that way, languages will display mostly (in
the extreme, only) the functionally usable structures, even if more structures
would be technically available.
– On a more optimistic note, could mismatch-demonstrating structures be in
fact unproblematic? Could, for example, extra-linguistic utterance contexts
supply enough information to make the mismatch-demonstrating structures
usable? Can we demonstrate that this hold for all cases?
With answers to some of these questions, maybe old discussions of how func-
tional grammars are can be laid to rest, as artefacts of theoretical descriptions.
From a formal point of view, grammars could be unproblematically expected to
produce mismatches between forms and (their) meanings, since a particularly
“hi-fi” mapping between these interfaces is not what such a formal system is con-
cerned about. It is certainly no coincidence in this regard that formal proposals
often point out the existence of non-communicative, in fact non-linguistic, appli-
cations of their formal machinery. Chomsky et al. (2019) argue that core syntax is
in no way trying to generate the usable sentences. Instead, it generates whatever
it can generate, with no concern for the usefulness of its output. In that way, it
is clear that core syntax cannot overgenerate structures in any meaningful way
(Chomsky et al. 2019: 38), since there is no standard by which overgeneration
could be judged. Furthermore, and maybe more interestingly, formal structures
that fail to map onto sentences may still be cognitively legitimate structures from






























‘Who do you ignore the boss will fire?’ (intended reading)
Suppose that (18-a) presupposes that the speaker does not know the identity of the
person to be fired, and suppose also that the speaker assumes that the addressee
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knows that some personXwill be fired. Then, it seems a legitimate question to ask
about the identity of X. However, for (18-b), if we assume that the speaker assumes
that the addressee of the questions ignores that the bosswill fire X (but still knows
who X is), why is (18-b) such an odd question from a grammatical point of view?
Why is it, furthermore, that we know what (18-b) would mean, if it was accept-
able? Maybe, sentences of this type (for an analysis, see Müller 2011) demonstrate
that the structures generated by core syntax are not, in fact, exclusively linguistic
objects, but can conform simply to “thoughts” in cases where they are not usable
as expressions of such thoughts (for whatever reasons)?
Similarly, some authors assume that the structure-forming capacity humans
display with language is not limited to linguistic expressions at all. Instead, its ef-
fects can be found in the structures found inmusic (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983),
mathematics (Hauser et al. 2002) or navigational skills (Shusterman et al. 2011). In
that way, structures that cannot map onto (all of) the linguistically relevant inter-
face systemsmay still be able to be constitute legitimate outputs for other systems
and their interfaces.
Given how contingent such considerations seem to make what linguistic out-
puts must look like, we can also ask whether in cross-linguistic comparisons, we
can find evidence that it is requirements of the interfaces specifically used for cer-
tain languages that constitute the mechanisms that whittle away unusable struc-
tures, as we put it above. Kremers (2013) points out that at least one linguistic
factor that we have considered as indispensable for syntactic sentence formation
above may be a logically independent factor, stemming from the contingencies
of the externalization channel a language uses. We have assumed above that the
linearization of structures, as well as questions of copy spellout, in Chomskyan
generative grammar reflect the fact that languages certainly have to bring about
word orders in a language. As Kremers points out, however, sign languages em-
ploy a different (manual-visual) channel of externalization, which does not im-
pose the same requirements.Multiple signs can be externalized simultaneously in
such languages, at least to some degree. It seems reasonable, then, to askwhether
linearization factors are, in fact, grammatical factors in the first place. It could
be assumed, from a Chomskyan point of view, that syntax is completely uncon-
cerned with linear orderings, and caters almost exclusively to the semantic inter-
face. From a functional point of view, a similar argument could be made, since
word orders are superficial properties for such theories, and semanto-pragmatic
functions are more central to their inner workings. Again, we find that, at least
to some level of granularity, the dispute between functionalist and formalist ap-
proaches to grammar may not be quite as substantial as has often been assumed.
What certainly remains is the questions about which mismatches arise where in
language, and why.
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5 What can we hope to achieve?
In the sections above,wehave tried to preempt certain types of criticism that some
reader might leverage against the basis of the questions we are trying to pose. Far
from constituting a meaningless or even self-contradictory program, we believe
that finding indeterminacies, unregulated properties and (resulting) mismatches
between the subcomponents of grammars seems aworthwhile and interesting en-
deavor. By identifyingpointswhere grammars seem to slack off (creating apparent
or real mapping issues) we arrive at points where we can try to observe (at least
the shadowy outlines of) what it means tomap thoughts onto expressions.Which
aspects of the relevant interface systems tend to get lost in translation? Will we
find that functional(ist) conceptions have it right, and mismatches and inconsis-
tencies are only ever slight, and maybe explicable as historical contingencies, or
even only apparent altogether?
If the mismatches are real, can we find reasons for any seemingly negligent
behaviors? Canwe identify subsystems that are particularly prone to creatingmis-
matches and indeterminacies, and maybe exploiting the options creatively, sim-
ilar to the way that Brandt and Fuß (2013a) envision? Can the mismatches that
occur be squared with functionalist assumptions – which take it that languages
should comprise relatively “hi-fi” translations from “meanings” to “expressions”
– or do they constitute actual problems for (at least overly optimistic, or overly
simplistic) functionalist hopes? We do not claim to have any answers to these
questions, but we believe that the discipline is in a position at least to begin an-
swering them.
As for the rewards of doing so, we believe that an analogy may be interesting
to contemplate. In many psycholinguistic experiments, it is problems of process-
ing that yield the best insights into how the processing mechanisms may work.
It is production and comprehension errors, in other words, that often help out-
line what a processing device may look like that would be prone to make such
errors. In trying to identify structural mismatches, between different levels of rep-
resentation, between different (or even within) grammatical subcomponents, we
can, at least with some (admittedly necessary) optimism, hope to achieve some-
thing similar for the description of language structures and the knowledge speak-
ers have about such structures. If a system of knowledge exists which transcends
the processingmechanisms of neuro- and psycholinguistic interest at all, wemay
hope to find what the possibilities and limits of the system of knowledge are.
We may hope to conclude from there what that system of knowledge (which we
can never observe directly, but only in its outputs) may look like – and whether
it appears to be a demonstrably different system from the processing machin-
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ery that neuro- and psycholinguistic research has already begun to outline. Mis-
matches and indeterminacies may provide a window into such knowledge sys-
tems (implementing competence), we hope, and show how they are different from
or similar to processing errors and speaker/hearer workloads (relating to perfor-
mance).
In sum, mismatches, indeterminacies and absent regulations may turn out
to provide central evidence for the knowledge systems language users command
– in addition to the matching of form-meaning pairs via precise regulations that
grammars have already described successfully.
6 Contents of this volume
The articles collected in this volumeaddress the overarching question of responsi-
ble subsystems neglecting their (assumed) duties, creating indeterminacies and/
or mapping issues. The collection covers a wide range of possible connections be-
tween a partially indeterminate system (mostly syntax and/or morphology) and
other systems that the apparently negligent systems relate to. Looking at these
contributions, it seems to us that certain types of arguments can be made out,
and we have grouped the articles in the parts of the volume according to these
approaches (as perceived by us).
Part I: Apparent indeterminacies can be explained away
– The contribution by Grohmann, Kambanaros, Leivada, and Pavlou ad-
dresses optionality in clitic placement that results from the bilingual sit-
uation in Cyprus where both Standard Modern Greek (SMG) and Cypriot
Greek (CG) are used as spoken languages, albeit in different contexts. One
prominent difference between SMG and CG concerns the placement of object
clitics. In a nutshell, contexts where SMG requires proclitic placement cor-
respond to contexts in CG where enclitic placement is required. Grohmann
and colleagues show first that for bilingual Cypriot speakers clitic place-
ment is truly free. Second, they argue that sociolinguistic variables are no
good predictors for this optionality in clitic placement. Third, although clitic
placement for Cypriot speakers hence looks like the prime example for op-
tionality, they suggest that this optionality is due to the presence of two
grammars, one with proclitic placement, the other with enclitic placement.
Therefore, they conclude that this situation does not represent a case of
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optionality. Instead, speakers simply have two grammars, each of which op-
erates deterministically. Therefore, there is no indeterminacy anywhere, in
any of the systems involved. Rather, multiple grammatical systems are at
issue, which, confusingly, are potentially employed by one and the same
speaker.
– Amaechi and Georgi discuss the apparent optionality between wh-move-
ment and wh-in-situ in Igbo. That this optionality is only apparent is ar-
gued for on the basis of a battery of tests that support the presence of wh-
movement. For as the authors show, both the structures with wh-movement
and those without exhibit properties indicative for wh-movement. Therefore,
what seems to represent a syntactic indeterminacy is in fact no such thing.
Syntax deterministically derives a single output structure (with displace wh
items in every single case). What the authors then show is that the choice
between wh-movement and wh-in-situ does not reduce to optionality at PF
either. That is, it is not the case that PF is free to choose which copy in a
chain to spell out. Instead, information structure drives the decision deter-
ministically. Amaechi and Georgi conclude that the Igbo data favor a view
where PF and LF are not independent from each other, but communicate
with each other: a distinction relevant at LF can have influence on a choice
located at PF. As with Grohmann and colleagues, we do not observe any
actual optionality, but only mismatches between system driven by different
interface requirements: syntax has to represent question semantics, but PF
can integrate requirements of information structure.
– In their paper about verb agreement in Santiago Tz’utujil, Levin, Lyskawa,
andRanero focus on a curious property of the language: Agreement seems to
be optional with 3rd person plural arguments. Excluding phonological and
morphological aspects that could be responsible for this optionality, they
argue that the optionality goes along with a structural difference between
the targets of the agreement process. Some arguments can be DPs, some can
be NPs. Since the presence of the D0-head is crucial for the application of
Agree according to Levin and colleagues, the apparent optionality reduces
to deterministic derivations. This however is masked by the fact that D0 is
empty in Santiago Tz’utujil, so that at PF the two structures look nearly iden-
tical. Again, there are no real indeterminacies to investigate, since all the
involved derivations operate deterministically. However, as in other cases
of structural ambiguities, the component that derives the surface forms of
these deterministic derivations is unable to represent the differences between
them.
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Part II: (Real) Indeterminacies that represent the limited
resolution of some subsystem
– Leivada in her contribution discusses so-called mid-level syntactic gener-
alizations and what they reveal about the way grammars are organized. By
mid-level syntactic generalizations, Leivada refers to generalizations that
refer neither to purely abstract concepts, nor to mere surface aspects of sen-
tence structure. She discusses two such generalizations, Cinque’s adverb
hierarchy and the Final-over-Final Constraint, and argues that both are too
restrictive. That is, there exist real counterexamples that cannot be made
compatible with them (unless ad hoc machinery is introduced). The rele-
vance for the questions this volume addresses is that syntax is only par-
tially restrictive: It is merely responsible for the mergers of two items, reg-
ulated by very general principles. Everything beyond that is relegated to
other components of the grammar. Syntax provides a multitude of possi-
ble well-formed structures. What looks like rigidity is really a reflection of
syntactic indeterminacy, coupled with restrictions issued by other linguistic
systems.
– The article by Haider investigates various “free” word order phenomena
in German, Dutch, some Slavic languages and compares these to yet other
languages and their word order properties. Haider argues strictly against a
“deterministic” solution to such word order options, since no syntactic trig-
gers of any kind can be formulated that would allow to describe the available
options – rather than just restate them in technical terms, as cartographic
triggers have done. Haider therefore argues that certain types of languages
allow for more variable argument placements. These languages have head-
final predicate projections, i. e. phrase structures that allow arguments to
be linearized to the left of their predicate heads. For example, in languages
with an OV verb phrase (as well as in “T3” languages which allow both OV
and VO), the re-merger of a verbal argument “to the left” leaves the argument
within the licensing domain of the predicate, and word order is therefore
“free”. The same holds for other types of phrases, e. g. adjectival phrases
(but not, e. g. head-initial NPs) in German. The options generated in such
languages (which, by our definition, allow “redundant” mappings from se-
mantics to syntax) may be exploited by other systems, in that information
structure, prosody, sentence-level semantics, etc. come to make use of the
available options. However, the options cannot be taken to “express” the dis-
tinctions of interfacing systems, Haider argues – instead, the system remains
“redundant” with regard to these systems.
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– Bader’s contribution deals with verb clusters. A verb cluster is a string of
non-finite verbs and one finite verb in embedded clauses in German. They
result from the OV-property of German. If the object of some verb is an infini-
tive, two adjacent verbs result: [[OV]V]. Since the object of the infinitive can
be an infinitive again, a principally unlimited number of adjacent verbs can
appear in German embedded clauses. What is interesting about verb clusters
is that the order of the verbs involved is to a certain extent free. In particular,
the finite verb can appear at various positions of the cluster (with dialectal
preferences) and also the order of the non-finite verbs can vary. Sowhich verb
follows which other verb in a verb cluster is basically optional. Bader shows
first that one is truly dealing with optionality because the different order-
ings have no semantic or information structural effect. Bader then addresses
the questions how to interpret and implement this optionality. He rejects
the simplest assumption, namely that the optionality reduces to frequency,
because the acceptability of the various orders does not line up with their fre-
quency. Instead, Bader suggests that the constraints that are responsible for
the verb cluster orderings are weighed, and that the weight they are assigned
is independent of frequency.
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